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Objectives. Thenotion of intrapsychic conflict has been present in psychopathology for
more than a century within different theoretical orientations. However, internal conflicts
have not received enough empirical attention, nor has their importance in depression
been fully elaborated. This study is based on the notion of cognitive conflict, understood
as implicative dilemma (ID), and on a newway of identifying these conflicts bymeans of the
Repertory Grid Technique. Our aim was to explore the relevance of cognitive conflicts
among depressive patients.
Design. Comparison between persons with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder
and community controls.
Methods. A total of 161 patients with major depression and 110 non-depressed
participantswere assessed for presenceof IDs and level of symptom severity. The content
of these cognitive conflicts was also analysed.
Results. Repertory grid analysis indicated conflict (presence of ID/s) in a greater
proportion of depressive patients than in controls. Taking only those grids with conflict,
the average number of IDs per person was higher in the depression group.In addition,
participantswith cognitive conflicts displayed higher symptom severity.Within the clinical
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sample, patientswith IDs presented lower levels of global functioning and amore frequent
history of suicide attempts.
Conclusions. Cognitive conflicts were more prevalent in depressive patients and were
associatedwith clinical severity. Conflict assessment at pre-therapy could aid in treatment
planning to fit patient characteristics.
Practitioner points
 Internal conflicts have been postulated in clinical psychology for a long time but there is little evidence
about its relevance due to the lack of methods to measure them.
 We developed a method for identifying conflicts using the Repertory Grid Technique.
 Depressive patients have higher presence and number of conflicts than controls.
 Conflicts (implicative dilemmas) can be a new target for intervention in depression.
Cautions/Limitations
 A cross-sectional design precluded causal conclusions.
 The role of implicative dilemmas in the causation or maintenance of depression cannot be ascertained
from this study.
Recent research has produced growing evidence for the role of cognitive factors (e.g.,
automatic thoughts, dysfunctional schemas, attribution bias) in the onset and mainte-
nance of depression (e.g., Abramson et al., 2002). However, internal conflicts have not
been considered in the cognitive model of depression even when they have been quite a
common notion in psychology for more than a century. Indeed, various psychological
theories have underlined the relevance of intrapsychic conflicts leading people to internal
struggles that might block their development, giving rise to suffering and symptoms.
Foremost, the importance of intrapsychic conflict is highlighted in virtually all
psychoanalytic theories (e.g., Horowitz, 1988). Furthermore, a classical notion addressing
internal conflict is that of cognitive dissonance, but we can find other more clinically
oriented approaches such as those of Grawe’s (2004) incongruence theory, and widely
used concepts of resistance and ambivalence in psychotherapy (e.g., Engle & Arkowitz,
2006). Another approach, Perceptual Control Theory (Powers, 2005) proposes a major
role of goal conflict and influenced Grawe’s (2004) work. More recently, it has led to the
development of method of levels, a transdiagnostic cognitive therapy which focuses
specifically on conflict formulation (e.g., Carey, 2008; Mansell, Carey, & Tai, 2012). These
authors consider conflicts as common processes underlying psychological distress and so
aim at resolving them through reorganizing conflictual cognitive control systems.
Unfortunately, and in contrast with the relative abundance of clinical literature,
intrapersonal conflict is yet an underresearched topic within contemporary clinical
psychology. Empirical research about this topic is needed to clarify to what extent
cognitive conflicts might play a role in the onset and maintenance of psychological
disorders, and whether they could be important in explaining some patients’ difficulties
for change (Michalak, Heidenreich, & Hoyer, 2011).
The growing literature around intrapersonal conflict and its role in psychological
distress has supported the idea that, although conflict might be quite a common
phenomenon, some forms of unresolved inner conflict lies at the core of many
psychopathological manifestations (e.g., Carey, 2008; Lauterbach, 1996; Mansell, 2005).
Broadly, two kinds of methods have been used to investigate the role of intrapersonal
conflicts. On the one hand, various approaches created specific methods for measuring
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implicit conflicts. For instance, psychodynamic theories developed operationalized
systems for assessing conflict as a crucial diagnostic axe (e.g., Cierpka, Rudolf, Grande, &
Stasch, 2007; Luborsky, 1977; Perry, 1990). Lauterbach (1996; Lauterbach & Newman,
1999) developed the intrapersonal conflict test for quantifying conflict based on Heider’s
(1946) balance theory and, thus, defined conflict as inconsistency between attitudes and
beliefs. Studies using these methods have reported correlations between conflicts and
symptom severity (e.g., Renner & Leibetseder, 2000) and reduction of conflict after
psychotherapy (e.g., Hoyer, Fecht, Lauterbach, & Schneider, 2001). A common feature of
these methods is that the elements involved in these conflicts are defined a priori by the
researcher.
On the other hand, a second cluster of approaches have developed methods for
quantifying conflict among ideographically generated personal goals (e.g., Emmons&King,
1988; Little, Salmera-Aro, & Phillips, 2007). Research on this topic has shown that goal
conflict influenced subjective well-being and life satisfaction (see Riediger, 2007, for a
review). High levels of goal conflicts were associated with increased levels of negative
affect, depression, neuroticism, and psychosomatic complains (see Michalak et al., 2011,
for a review). These methods are based mainly on motivational conflicts (e.g.,
approach-avoidance) and restricted to conscious interference between goals (as reported
by participants). Therefore, they may be more sensitive to social desirability and
self-presentation effects which may limit their applicability in psychotherapy. This vein
of research has shown, nonetheless, how conflict, as a motivational factor, influences
experience and behaviour generating behaviour inhibition, motivational deficits, and
difficulties in action control (e.g., Emmons, King, & Sheldon, 1993). It is reasonable to
assume that these difficulties can be contributing to a variety of depressive symptoms (e.g.,
reducedactivity), to theirpersistenceover timeand, especially, to the engagementof clients
in the process of therapeutic change. But further empirical studies are warranted to verify
the extent and nature of the influence of conflict on depression and other disorders.
In this article, we build on existing support for the relevance of conflicts by studying
the role of a particular variety of cognitive conflict, called implicative dilemma (ID) (see
Feixas, Saul, & Avila, 2009), in a sample of patients diagnosed with major depression. Our
study is based onKelly’s personal construct theory (1955/1991)which provides a suitable
conceptual and methodological framework for the empirical study of internal conflicts
related to the construction of the self. In brief, Kelly’s theory explores the subjective way
inwhich people construct their experience by analysing their personal constructs, which
are bipolar dimensions of personal meanings (e.g., being depressed vs. happy). This
theory holds an agentive (Bandura, 2001) and proactive vision of human beings, and so
asserts that individuals regulate motivational, emotional processes, and actions on the
basis of the congruence or discrepancy between the construction of the ‘self’ and the
‘ideal self’ (coinciding with Carver & Scheier, 1998; Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Higgins,
1987). But self-ideal discrepancy is not necessarily a conflict. For conceptualizing
conflicts, personal construct theory acknowledges that humans may employ a variety of
constructions which are inferentially incompatible with each other (Kelly’s fragmen-
tation corollary). From this perspective, it is likely that dilemmas arise when a person
has to reconcile the self with personally held values. For instance, Rowe (1971)
described the case of a chronic depressive patient who faced the dilemma between
staying depressed (associated in her construct system with ‘being human’) or change,
and become a ‘destructive’ or ‘unpleasant’ person (according to her own vision). This
was conflict stemming from the particular configuration of implications of her
construct system.
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Kelly’s Repertory Grid Technique (RGT; Feixas & Cornejo, 2002; Fransella, Bell, &
Bannister, 2004) allows for an individually tailored assessment of conflictual configura-
tions of personal constructswithin the client’s cognitive system. Specifically, the notionof
ID (Feixas & Saul, 2004; Feixas et al., 2009) makes reference to those conflicts in which a
desired change (e.g., stop being depressed) implies an unwished change (e.g., becoming
unpleasant). In this example, we see that a change in specific, symptom level aspects
implies a change in identity (i.e., becoming a different kind of person). Operationally, two
types of personal constructs are involved in an ID.On the onehand,discrepant constructs
are those in which the person perceives a significant discrepancy between the ‘present
self’ and the ‘ideal self’ so that one pole of the construct describes the present and the
other pole the ideal self. They typically signify areas ofmalaise, such as symptoms inwhich
change from one pole to the opposite one is desired. On the other hand, congruent
constructs represent areas of self-satisfaction (as indicated by the similarity between the
present and the ideal self, both described by one construct pole) which might be
connected to personal values or beliefs. In the example of Figure 1, the participant
considered herself as being the kind of person who ‘does not love herself’ (left pole) but
shewould like to start ‘loving herself’ (right pole of the discrepant construct). At the same
time, in congruency with her ideal self, she considered herself as being ‘protective’ (left
pole) and did not want to become ‘unemotional’ (right pole of the congruent construct;
note that all these constructs are personal, i.e., her own words). The RGT allows for the
calculation of correlations among all the constructs elicited from the interviewee. So,
whenever an association is found between the desired pole of the discrepant construct
(‘love herself’ in Figure 1) and the undesirable pole of the congruent construct
(‘unemotional’ in Figure 1), an ID is identified. Therefore, discrepant constructs per se
do not represent a conflict but just a discrepancy, a goal that should be attained. Rather, it
is the conflictive association between a discrepant and a congruent construct which
causes conflict. In these cases, the need for change (she wants to love herself) might be
hindered by the need for self-ideal congruency (continue being protective). What an ID
tells us is that the need for change expressed by the discrepant construct is in conflictwith
the need for coherence expressed by the congruent construct. Thus, the patient
unwittingly hesitates in taking a clear course of action because striving for loving herself
has negative implications for her identity. In the view of such a dilemma, change may be
less likely to occur because abandoning the symptomswould result in invalidation of core
aspects of the self.
Figure 1. Example of an implicative dilemma of a depressed patient from the clinical sample.
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The measure of IDs is both standardized and quantifiable in structure, and idiographic
in content. It is also relevant for explaining both symptommaintenance and ambivalence
towards change. In addition, it lessens the effect of social desirability given that conflicting
constructs are detected from grid data using a structured computerized procedure (see
below) which is not evident to the subject and does not employ any explicit question
about conflicts. Thus, this method using IDs could constitute an integration of the
advantages of the aforementioned approaches considering that it assesses conflict in a
way which is not based in the explicit wording of a contradiction or conflict by the
interviewees but by means of more implicit associations among their specific self-gen-
erated goals (personal constructs).
Early studies within the Multicenter Dilemma Project (Feixas & Saul, 2004; www.usal.
es/tcp) showed the relevance of IDs across various clinical samples over other types of
cognitive conflicts. For instance, Feixas et al. (2009) found that more than half of a group
of patients seeking psychotherapy (n = 284) presented this type of cognitive conflict. By
contrast, less than a third of the non-clinical group (n = 322) did so. This significant
difference was not found with other existing procedures to identify conflicts such as
unbalanced triads (e.g., Sheehan, 1981). In a subsequent study with 87 patients it was
found that most patients who presented conflicts at the initial psychotherapy assessment
did not have those conflicts at post-therapy. Also, resolution of IDs was associated with
symptom improvement (Feixas, Saul, Winter, & Watson, 2008). In fact, in those cases in
which conflicts were not resolved had a poorer outcome. These studies suggest that IDs
could be targeted for psychotherapeutic intervention and their resolution could be
pursued as a way out from suffering, blockage, and recurrence.
Although several treatments have proved their effectiveness in the treatment of
depression,more than20%of all patientswith amajor depressive episodedevelop a chronic
course (Angst, Gamma, R€ossler, Ajdacic, & Klein, 2009; Rubio et al., 2011). To date, there
are no conclusive data about risk factors for chronic depression (H€olzel, Harter, Reese, &
Kriston, 2011) neither consistentmarkers nor diagnostic tests topredict recovery (Solomon
et al., 2008). Furthermore, duration of illness and intervals between episodes are highly
variable from one patient to another which limits clinical decision making. In this sense,
cognitive conflicts might help expand cognitive models of depression and provide a
theoretical explanation as well as practical procedures to approach relapse and chronicity.
The notion of ID seems particularly suitable for that because it encompasses both the
patient’s need for change and his or her need for continuity.
Preliminary evidence for increased levels of conflict in depressed patients comes from
studies showing significant associations between emotional distress and intergoal
interference or attitude inconsistencies. In regard to goal conflicts, although two studies
found that conflict was associated with higher levels of depression, two studies failed to
replicate the findings in undergraduate and in outpatient samples (see Michalak et al.,
2011, for a review). In addition, a clinical study (P€uschel, Schulte, & Michalak, 2011)
associated motive-goal discrepancies with higher levels of depression and reduced sense
of coherence. Research using Lauterbach’s assessment of conflict found inverse
relationships between conflict and mood in non-clinical samples. Furthermore, a recent
study comparing depressed inpatients and controls showed large differences in
conflictual constellations (Stangier, Ukrow, Schermelleh-Engel, Grabe, & Lauterbach,
2007). Finally, two preliminary studies, one with a sample of mixed depressive disorders
(Feixas, Montesano, Erazo-Caicedo, Compa~n, & Pucurull, 2014) and another with
dysthymic patients (Montesano et al., 2014), found higher percentages of clinical
participants presenting with IDs as compared to controls. However, to our knowledge, a
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systematic evaluation of cognitive conflicts in major depression has not yet been
conducted.
This study explored the relevance of IDs to major depression by testing three
hypotheses. First, based upon previous findings, we hypothesized that IDswould appear in
greater frequencyandproportion indepressed thannon-depressedparticipants. The results
of the abovementionedprevious studieswerepromisingbuthad importantmethodological
limitations such as heterogeneity of diagnosis, small sample size, or inadequate control
groups. To increase the generalizability of those findings, this study investigates the role of
IDs in major depression by (1) using more careful sampling processes, (2) increasing the
number of participants, and (3) refining the assessment methodology.
Our second hypothesis proposed that presence and number of IDs would be
associated with different clinically relevant variables. Concretely, we expected that
participants presenting with IDs would display higher levels of symptom severity, poorer
global functioning, and higher prevalence of recurrent episodes. Finally, we explored the
content of constructs forming IDs. In accordance with previous findings (Montesano
et al., 2014) and the theoretical structure represented in Figure 1, we expected that
discrepant constructs would reflect predominantly emotional content connected to
depressive symptoms (e.g., happy vs. depressed), whereas congruent constructs would
be mostly of moral nature (e.g., good vs. bad) usually considered typical of core
constructs, values, and beliefs.We predicted that this thematic configurationwould differ
from that of non-depressed participants.
Methods
Participants
The overall sample of the study consisted of 271 participants of both genders distributed in
two different groups, 161 depressed patients and 110 controls. For the major depression
sample inclusion criteria were as follows: (1) 18–70 years of age, (2) meeting DSM-IV-TR
(APA, 2000) criteria for major depression, and (3) a score of more than 19 on the Beck
Depression Inventory, second edition (BDI-II; Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1996). Exclusion
criteria were (1) presence of bipolar, schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorders, (2)
presence of psychotic symptoms, (3) current substance abuse, and (4) organic mental
disorder, brain dysfunction or pervasive developmental delay. These criteria were adopted
following the example of similar studies. In regard to patients’ recruitment, 233 patients
were referred to the studybut 47were initially excludeddue to several reasons (notmeeting
age inclusion criterion, declining to participate, or not answering the phone). Of the 186
whowere assessed, 19were excluded because they did notmeet diagnostic criteria and six
rejected further participation in the study. Finally, the clinical samplewas composed of 161
patients (78.3% females) recruited from several community health care centres of the city of
Barcelona (Spain) and its surrounding area. The presence of other comorbid diagnoses was
not criterion of exclusion, but it was recorded as a variable and controlled in statistical
analyses. About 40%of participants presentedwith another Axis I diagnosis: panic disorder,
18.6%; panic disorder with agoraphobia, 8.7%; dysthymic disorder, 6.2%; post-traumatic
stress disorder, 3.7%; anxiety disorder not specified, 1.9%; anorexia nervosa, 0.6%. Patients
meeting the inclusion criteria and willing to participate in the study gave written informed
consent on forms approved by local research ethics committees.
The non-clinical sample was composed of 110 participants (71.8% females). The
inclusion criteria were as follows: (1) 18–65 years of age, (2) to score less than 14 on the
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BDI-II (to ensure that they did not present significant depressive symptomatology), and (3)
no history of psychiatric or neurological illness.
The demographic and clinical characteristics of participants are summarized in
Table 1. No significant differences were found between the two groups in gender, age,
and years of educationwhereas, as expected, samples differed significantly inBDI-II scores
and number of constructs (e.g., Feixas, Erazo, Harter, & Bach, 2008; Feixas, Saul, et al.,
2008).
Instruments and measures
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams,
1996)
The SCID-I is a semistructured interview that includes modules designed to assess either
the lifetime or current experience of categorically defined DSM-IV-TR Axis I psychiatric
disorders. SCID-I diagnoses display adequate test–retest reliability for major depressive
disorder in clinical samples (K = .66; Lobbestael, Leurgans, & Arntz, 2011). Information
regarding diagnosis, global assessment scale scores, and history of suicide attempts was
also gathered for each depressed participant.
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996)
The BDI-II is a self-report measure of depression that has demonstrated strong internal
consistency in psychiatric outpatients (.92). It was used to assess participants’ symptom
severity. Jacobson and Truax (1991) formula to distinguish functional and dysfunctional
population yielded a cut-off of 16.92 using Spanish normative data (Sanz & Vazquez,
2011). Having that score as a reference, we limited to 14 the maximum score for the
control group and aminimumof 19 for the clinical sample as away to control the symptom
level within groups.
Repertory Grid Technique
The RGT is a constructivist assessment procedure originally proposed by Kelly (1955/
1991). It is a semistructured interview in which the interviewer first elicits elements
(present self, ideal self, and significant others identified by the participant). Then, these
elements are considered in dyads (two elements at a time) to elicit personal constructs by
asking for similarities and differences between each pair of elements (e.g., both mother
and sister are ‘friendly’). For each similarity or difference described by the participant, an
opposite construct pole is also elicited (e.g., ‘friendly vs. unconcerned’). Elicitation
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of depressed patients and non-clinical participants
Characteristics Depression group Control group p value
Gender (female:male) 126:35 79:31 .29
Age (M; SD) 47.1; 11.3 44.5; 14.4 .11
Years of education (M; SD) 11.9; 2.4 12.2; 3.8 .52
No. of constructs (M; SD) 18.8; 5.1 23.2; 7.4 <.001
BDI-II (M; SD) 36.1; 9.8 5.3; 4.4 <.001
Note. M = mean; SD = standard deviation; BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II.
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continues until the person is unable to generate additional constructs and, then, the
interviewer asks the participant to rate each element on each of the elicited personal
constructs. These ratings use a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very much like the left
pole of the construct to verymuch like the contrasting right pole. This provides amatrix of
ratings for each participant’s grid, with columns representing important people of her or
his interpersonal world (elements) and rows representing construct dimensions (see
Figure 2 for an example). Several indexes can be obtained through the mathematical
analysis of the grid matrix; for the purpose of this study, twomeasures related to IDswere
used:
(1) Presence of IDs: According to Feixas and Saul (2004) a construct is classified as
discrepant whenever the ratings assigned to the element ‘present self’ and the
element ‘ideal self’ differ on 4 or more points within the 7-point scale used.
Conversely, those constructs inwhich the score given to ‘present self’ and ‘ideal self’
coincide (or there is no more than 1-point difference) are identified as congruent
constructs. Whenever either of the two elements is rated as 4 (the middle point),
then it is excluded from this classification. An ID is detected whenever the
correlation between the ratings given to a discrepant construct and those given to a
congruent construct is .35 or higher so that the desired pole of the discrepant
construct is associated with the undesired pole of the congruent construct (see
Figure 1). It is important to note that the desirability of the poles is regarded by the
score that participants give to their element ‘ideal-self’ for each construct. The
cut-off of .35 is based on Cohen’s guidelines (1988) indicating that a correlation
equal or higher than .30 implies a medium strength of the relationship for which we
have summed a conservative add-on of .05 points.
(2) Percentage of implicative dilemmas (PID): This percentage reveals the number of
IDs in a participant’s grid taking into account its size. Since the number of constructs
elicited during RGT administration varies across participants (thus influencing the
possible number of IDs within a grid) this measure is calculated by dividing the
Figure 2. Example of the repertory grid of a patient of the clinical sample.
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number of dilemmas of a grid by the total number of possible combinations of
constructs of such grid taking two at a time. The resultingproportion ismultiplied by
100 to find the percentage.
The reliability of the RGT has been estimated with test–retest studies providing stability
scores of 71–77% for the elements, and 47.7–69% for the elicited constructs.With respect
to the measures derived from the RGT, studies provide test–retest correlations ranging
from .61 to .95 (Feixas, Lopez Moliner, Navarro Montes, Tudela Marı, & Neimeyer, 1992;
see Feixas & Cornejo, 2002, for a review).
Classification System for Personal Constructs (CSPC; Feixas, Geldschl€ager, & Neimeyer, 2002)
The CSPC is a system designed to analyse and classify the content of personal constructs
derived from constructivist assessment procedures, and particularly from the RGT. The
CSPC is composed of 45 exclusive and mutually excluding categories arranged into six
thematic areas (moral, emotional, relational, personal, intellectual, specific values, and
interests). Feixas et al. (2002) reported a high reliability index for the CSPC (K = .93). It
has already been applied to personal constructs of depressed (Montesano, Feixas, &
Varlotta, 2009) and fibromyalgia patients (Compa~n et al., 2011).
Procedure
Participants in the depressed groupwere recruited throughmedical referrals from several
health care centres from the city of Barcelona from 2008 to 2011. After referral they were
contacted for assessment sessions in their respective centres. Two independent and
specifically trained master-level students administered the instruments in face-to-face
interviews. These evaluators used the SCID-I, the BDI-II and other supplemental
information to determine if the patient met inclusion criteria. Control group participants
were recruited through agreements with cultural and civic associations to which free
psycho-educational talks were offered in compensation for their participation in the
study. Also, a call was made among graduate and undergraduate students to refer
non-clinical participants (friends and relatives) for the study. Non-depressed participants
were also administered the BDI-II to rule out depressive symptoms and to ensure the
fulfilment of inclusion criteria. All participants provided informed consent. A second
appointment was then scheduled to complete the assessment process with the RGT.
Conflicts were analysed post hoc with the GRIDCOR v. 4.0 (Feixas et al., 2002) software
and exported into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 20.0 (IBM
Corporation, Armonk, New York, NY, USA) datasheet for further analyses. Finally, two
independent well-trained graduate and undergraduate students codified with the CSCP
the content of the 907 constructs forming participants’ IDs (K = .98; p < .001). Raters did
not knowwhether the grids corresponded to the clinical or the comparison group nor the
hypotheses of the study.
Results
Presence and number of implicative dilemmas
With the purpose of checking whether the proportion of participants presenting at least
one IDwasdifferent across samples, a chi-square test for independencewasperformed. The
results indicated a statistically significant association between presence of IDs and type of
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sample – v2(1, N = 271) = 30.08; p < .001 – with a moderate effect size (φ= .33). As
shown in Table 2, IDs were found in more than two-thirds of the depression sample in
contrast to about one-third of controls. To examine the influence of gender, the proportion
of male and female participants with and without IDs was compared within both samples.
Similar proportions of participants with and without IDs were found in the clinical
(females = 69 vs. 31%; males = 65.7 vs. 34.3%) and the non-clinical samples
(females = 34.2 vs. 65.8%; males = 35.5 vs. 64.5%). As expected, there were no statistical
differences between gender and presence of IDs in the depression group – v2(1) = 0.14;
p = .71 – neither in the comparison group – v2(1) = 0.17; p = .89. The influence of
presenting a comorbid diagnosis within the clinical sample was also tested, with results
indicating no differences – v2(1) = 0.20; p = .88 – in the presence nor in the number of IDs
(U = 3,008;p = .69)betweenclinicalparticipantswith (M = 2.60; SD = 3.76) andwithout
(M = 2.71; SD = 3.65) another Axis I diagnosis.
With respect to the number of IDs, an independent samples t-test was conducted to
compare the number of IDs between participants presenting IDs of both groups. There
was a significant difference – t(94.37) = 3.27; p = .002 – in PID scores for depressed
(M = 3.90; SD = 3.88) and control participants (M = 2.04; SD = 2.65). Themagnitude of
the differences (mean difference = 1.85, 95% CI: 2.98 to .73) was large (d = .67).
Implicative dilemmas and clinical measures
Several analyses were performed to test the relationship of IDs with various clinically
relevant variables. Significant differences were found – t(249) = 5.47, p < .001
(two-tailed) g2 = .10 (medium effect) – in BDI-II scores for participants with
(M = 28.55; SD = 15.53; n = 148) and without IDs (M = 17.58; SD = 17.13; n = 123).
To explore the relationship between symptom severity and number of IDs (in participants
presenting IDs), BDI-II and PID correlationswere calculated using Spearman’s coefficient.
There was a medium positive correlation between the two variables (q =.29, n = 148,
p = .001). PID scores explained 8.41% of the variance in respondent’s scores on BDI-II.
The relationship between IDs and chronicity was inspected attending to the
recurrence of major depression episodes. In regard to presence of IDs and type of
diagnosis (single episode vs. recurrent), no significant difference was found – v2(1,
n = 161) = 0.93; p = .33. However, it is worth highlighting that of the patients with a
diagnosis of recurrent depression (n = 80), 72.5% presented IDs, and 27.5% did not.
Furthermore, comparing the number of dilemmas for those participants presenting with
IDs, aMann–Whitney test (U = 1,140; z = 2.20, p = .03, r = .21, small effect) indicated
Table 2. Presence of implicative dilemmas
Presence of implicative dilemmas
No Yes
Depression, n = 161
Fr 51 110
% 31.7 68.3
Non-clinical, n = 110
Fr 72 38
% 65.5 34.5
Note. Fr = frequency.
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a significant difference in the PID of single episode (M = 3.24; SD = 3.86; n = 52) and
recurrent depression patients (M = 4.49; SD = 3.84; n = 58).
The level of global functioning of depressed participants was examined in relation to
the presence and number of IDs. Significant differences in the global assessment scale
scores were found for participants with IDs (M = 56.3; SD = 7.3; n = 110) and without
IDs –M = 59.7; SD = 7.3; n = 51, t(159) = 2.76, p = .006; g2 = .046, medium effect. In
addition, Spearman’s correlation coefficient revealed a moderate negative correlation of
global functioning with the PID, q = .26, n = 161, p = .001. Another clinical issue
observed was the relationship between IDs and suicide attempts. Within the clinical
sample, 22 depressive patients (13.7%) had tried to commit suicide at least once. Among
these, 19 (86%) presented IDs while three did not. The BDI-II mean of these participants
was examined to check out whether this difference was attributable to the level of
symptomatology. Patients with IDs showed a lower score (M = 36.68; SD = 11.41) than
participants without conflicts (M = 45; SD = 4). Small sample size precluded further
statistical comparisons between these groups.
Content analysis of implicative dilemmas
Since previous results indicated that IDs might be a relevant structure in the cognition of
major depressive patients, a content analysis of its components was performed. We
observed statistically significant differences when comparing depressive patients and
controls with respect to the content of congruent – v2(5, n = 546) = 19.5; p = .002;
Cramer’s V = .189 – and discrepant constructs – v2(5, n = 332) = 15.76; p = .008;
Cramer’s V = .218. With regard to congruent constructs, moral (e.g., responsible vs.
irresponsible) and relational (e.g., tolerant vs. authoritarian) areas weremore prevalent in
the clinical sample, and congruent constructs were more emotional (visceral vs. rational)
and personal (organized vs. disorganized) in the comparison group. On the other hand,
discrepant constructs were more frequently coded as emotional for the clinical sample
Table 3. Differences between groups in the content of congruent and discrepant constructs forming
implicative dilemmas
Moral Emotional Relational Personal Intellectual Specific interests
CC
Depressed
% 36.7 11.2 31 13.6 1.7 6
Asr 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.8 1.5 0.2
Non-clinical
% 26.2 19 21.4 23.8 4 5.6
Asr 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.8 1.5 0.2
DC
Depressed
% 11 37.1 21.6 26.5 2.7 1.1
Asr 1.3 2.1 0.9 0.5 2.8 1.8
Non-clinical
% 5.9 23.5 26.5 29.4 10.3 4.4
Asr 1.3 2.1 0.9 0.5 2.8 1.8
Note. CC = congruent constructs; DC = discrepant constructs; Asr = adjusted standardized residuals.
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and as intellectual for non-depressed participants, according to the adjusted standardized
residual values (cut-off point of 1.96 for an a = .05, see Table 3).
We also testedwhether discrepant and congruent constructs presented different areas of
contentwithin the clinical sample andwhich categoriesweremore relevant for each type of
construct. Results showed that congruent constructs differed significantly (medium effect
size) from discrepant constructs in the type of content coded – v2(5, n = 684) = 121.15;
p < .001; Cramer’s V = .421. Congruent constructs belonged mostly to the moral and
relational areas, whereas discrepant constructs were predominantly of emotional and
personal content. For congruent constructs, the most frequent categories within the moral
area were ‘altruist–selfish’ (30.5%), ‘good person–bad person’ (24%), and ‘responsible–
irresponsible’ (16.2%). Categories within the relational area were ‘pleasant–unpleasant’
(17.7%), ‘tolerant–authoritarian’ (16.9%), and ‘extroverted–introverted’ (15.4%). On the
other hand, themost frequent categories for discrepant constructswithin theemotional area
were ‘balanced–unbalanced’ (32.7%), ‘optimistic–pessimistic’ (23.5%), and specific emo-
tions (22.4%). In the personal area only the category ‘strong–weak’ (20%) stood out.
Discussion
This study provided promising evidence for the relevance of IDs in major depression.
Indeed, inverse patterns were observed between samples: while over two thirds of
depressed patients presented at least one ID in their repertory grids, when assessed in the
control group this proportion was only one third. This difference was underlined by the
fact that, among thosewith at least one ID, depressed participants doubled the number of
IDs of controls. So, results indicated differences between depressed and non-depressed
participants regarding bothprevalenceof subjectswith conflicts and individual frequency
of conflicts. Results from this study not only confirm those of a preliminary study of Feixas
et al. (2014) with depressive patients but they are also consistent with previous findings
pointing out that IDs aremore frequent in a variety of clinical samples (e.g., Compa~n et al.,
2011; Dada, Feixas, Compa~n, &Montesano, 2012; Melis et al., 2011) including dysthymia
(Montesano et al., 2014). Arguably, this type of cognitive conflict is not specific to
depression but might cut across several diagnoses. Nevertheless, the proportion of
participants with IDs in our study was higher than in other diagnostic entities, which lead
us to consider that IDs play a significant role in depression.
The relevance of cognitive conflicts in major depression becomes more noticeable by
observing the relationship between IDs and some clinicalmeasures. In regard to symptom
severity, higher levels of symptoms were associated with both presence and number of
IDs in the sample as a whole. However, the correlation between BDI-II and PID explained
8.4% of the variance which is only a moderate support for the hypothesis that the number
of these cognitive conflicts is associated with higher level of symptoms. It might also be
the case that the relationship between symptom level and number of IDs is not linear. It
would be informative to explore with a prospective design whether these cognitive
conflicts are associated with higher rates of relapse and recurrence. In this study, we used
a retrospectivemeasure of chronicity comparing patientswith a single episode to patients
with a recurrent diagnosis. Our results indicated no significant difference between groups
in relation to the presence of IDs, but patients with recurrent depression showed a
tendency towards a higher number of IDs. Future research should include also more
refined assessments of the course of the disorder taking into account, for instance, age of
onset, number of episodes, and time between them.
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An unexpected finding of the studywas that clinical participantswith IDsmight have a
higher risk of committing suicide. Although the low number of cases precluded
performing statistical analyses, an inspection of BDI-II scores allowed us to discard
attributing this effect to symptom severity. In fact, therewere only three patients who did
not present any cognitive conflicts of the 22 who tried to commit suicide. These three
participants showed BDI-II scores much higher than the mean of the clinical sample. By
contrast, the remaining 19 showed almost the same symptom severity than the whole
clinical group. These preliminary results warrant further research to elucidate whether
presence of identity-related conflicts, and the blockage associated with them, could be
considered as a marker of suicidal attempts and constitute a mediating factor in the
cognitive processes involved in suicidal behaviour of depressed patients.
Differences between groupswere also found in relation to the global assessment scale.
Among depressed participants, those who presented one or more IDs tended to display
lower levels of global functioning. Likewise, number of dilemmaswas inversely associated
with global functioning scores indicating that patients with many IDs in their grids had a
poorer level of functioning. Epidemiological studies point out that most major depressive
patients tend to have, at some point in their evolution, substantial impairment of family,
work, or social life (Kessler et al., 2003). This study suggests that those patientswithmore
IDs might be contributing the most to those unfortunate effects.
Content analysis of the patients’ personal constructs offers a clearer image of how IDs
might be involved in symptom maintenance. As shown above, these identity-related
conflicts in depressed patients involve the association of symptom improvement with
undesired qualities such as negative moral values or undesired relational positions. This
reinforces the hypothesis that change may be less likely to occur (unless these dilemmas
are dealtwith in the therapy context) because eliminating the symptomswould imply also
abandoning core constructs, values, or beliefs. To a large extent, our results concur with
Rowe’s observation (1983) about a typical depressive dilemma ‘I’d rather be good than
happy’ (p. 87).
Limitations and clinical implications
While the results of this study have clarified the role of IDs in major depression, there are
limitations which need to be considered when interpreting the results and looking at
clinical implications. First of all, it is important to note that the cross-sectional design of this
study precluded causal analysis of reported associations. Second, as mentioned above,
prospective design research is needed to determine the influence of IDs over the clinical
course and rates of relapse and recurrence in depression. Third, in this study, the role of
negative self- views of depressed participant’s was not controlled. Arguably, the higher
intensity and prevalence of conflicts may respond to increased negativity of depressed
participants’ grid-ratings. However, it is important to note that the measure of IDs involves
not only negative but also positive self-constructions. For every discrepant construct there
is another congruent. In the light of our results, future research should elucidate whether
the self of depressed patients is predominantly conflictual or negative. Fourth, we did not
control the use of medication. Typically, drug treatments vary both within and between
subjects, and this might have influenced the findings regarding recurrence and severity of
symptoms. Finally, another limitation affecting generalizability is that our samples were
selected so to include those individuals with high and low levels of symptom severity for
clinical and control groups respectively. Although this selection helped to better depict
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the differences between samples, it is known that the distribution of depressive symptoms
in clinical (diagnosis of major depression) and general populations overlap.
Our findings nonetheless lead us to some preliminary clinical implications. First, the
concept of ID might help explain the difficulties that therapists frequently encounter
in fully engaging depressed patients into therapeutic change. For instance, a
prototypical intervention in cognitive therapy for depression consists of identifying
negative self-appraisals and directly challenging patients’ beliefs about themselves.
However, such intervention would increase its efficiency by taking into account the
possible positive attributes related to symptoms and negative self-perceptions. In doing
so, the intervention could better help in decreasing the chance of symptom
persistence, which may manifest itself in ‘resistance’ to change or relapse, due to
the lack of compatibility of the proposed change with the self-system. In this sense, it
is important to remark that the concept of ID takes into account not only the need for
change (discrepant constructs) but also the need for continuity and identity coherence
(congruent constructs). Second, therapeutic strategies aiming at resolving cognitive
conflicts should be helpful in alleviating depressive symptomatology. For instance,
psychological interventions could specifically target dilemmas insofar as they could
constitute a focus of therapeutic work and allow individualizing the design of the
treatment to fit patient subjective experience. It is noteworthy that although the
concept of ID arose from a particular theoretical framework (personal construct
theory), a dilemma-focused intervention could constitute an ‘add-on’ for a broad range
of therapeutic models as it is being tested out in combination with CBT (Feixas et al.,
2013). Thirdly, IDs can be detected by means of the RGT. Thus, treatment procedures
for preventing future relapses may benefit from screening for the presence of such
conflicts and targeting those for intervention in case they appear in the patient’s grid.
Certainly, knowledge of cognitive conflicts hindering change processes could shed
light on the personal factors that maintain or worsen the disorder.
As said, there are already some therapeutic models that pay special attention to
conflicts and ambivalent appraisals in relation to change processes. For example, the
motivational interviewing model upholds that depressed patients tend to be ambivalent
towards change. Decisional balance becomes then a preferred intervention (Arkowitz &
Miller, 2008). Coherence therapy (e.g., Ecker & Hulley, 2008) also pointed out that
symptom maintenance is linked to the need of preserving the coherence of self-identity.
The aforementioned method of levels therapy focuses exclusively on addressing conflict.
Our findings could be seen as empirical support for these models addressing ambivalence
and conflict in the psychotherapeutic process. Regardless of the actual model adopted, it
seems reasonable to assume that identity-related conflicts play a relevant role in depressed
patients’ cognitive system and change processes. Furthermore, it raises the need for the
study of the effectiveness of a dilemma-focused intervention for major depression (Feixas
et al., 2013), which should mainly set the agenda for our future research.
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